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Addiopizzo: Can a Label Defeat the Mafia?

Abstract

The Mafia in Sicily has important socio-economic effects on the local population. This paper focuses on the practice of asking for a “protection tax”, or *pizzo*, which is paid by close to 70% of the businesses in the region. In 2005, a group of young Palermitan professionals created an organization named Addiopizzo (goodbye pizzo) with the specific goal of fighting the Mafia’s extortion of money. They invented a label to certify that a business does not pay the pizzo. Using the resources offered by the market and the institutions, involving consumers, businesses, the police and schools, Addiopizzo was able to start a successful new trend of pizzo-free consumption.

Introduction

The Mafia has been rooted in Italian society in Sicily and in other Southern Italian regions such as Calabria, Puglia and Campania since before the creation of the Italian state. Many scholars identify the lack of effective political rule by the Spanish Habsburg Empire in the late 16th century as a reason for the establishment of the Mafia (Gambetta 2000). This created a sense of an absent state authority, a feeling that has continued until today. In this vacuum of authority, the Mafia established monopolistic control over all aspects of society through the use of violence and corruption. Politically, the existence of illicit connections between the Italian political world and the Mafia is well-known. Research conducted by Eurispes in 1994 revealed that the Mafia controlled 400,000 votes in Sicily, indicating that one tenth of the total electorate votes according to the Mafia’s directives (Cowell 1994). Thus, the Mafia’s preferences may have a decisive influence over electoral results.

The economic impact of the Mafia is no less worrisome. In fact, according to a report produced by the *Confesercenti* (an association representing small and medium enterprises in retail, tourism and services), the Mafia is the main enterprise in Italy, with annual profits close to 30 billion Euros. Usury provides the main monetary inflow. A second source of income, the “racket”—the act of asking for protection money or *pizzo* that the Mafia applies to any economic activity—garners 10 billion Euros per year (Figure 1) (La Repubblica 2007).

Figure.1: List of illegal activities, the money involved in that activity, and proportion of those activities that are managed by the Mafia.

Illegal Activity	Amount (in billions of Euros)	% managed by Mafia	Number of shopkeepers involved
Usury	30	36%	150,000
Racket (<i>pizzo</i>)	10	95%	160,000
Robbery	7	15%	90,000
Fraud	4.6	20%	500,000
Smuggling	2	80%	15,000
Counterfeit	7.4	70%	Not reported (N/R)
Illegal construction	13	20%	N/R
Agromafia ¹	7.5		N/R
Leasing and contracts	6.5		N/R
Gambling	2.5	80%	N/R
TOTAL	90.5	45%	N/R

Source: SOS Confesercenti/ Translation by Chiara Superti

Besides representing one of the main sources of financial support for the criminal organization, the *pizzo* also has important social and economic consequences

¹ Mafia involvement in illicit activities related to agricultural production.

in Sicily. It is likely to provoke an increase in the prices of products and services, as owners need to absorb the cost of “protection”. Additionally, the *pizzo* creates incentives to use cheaper, illegal labor. Lastly, the amount paid to the Mafia greatly decreases the actual profit of businesses, and it can seriously impact the sustainability of small enterprises.

For many years, Sicilians reacted by silently acquiescing. Citizens that did not accept the status quo emigrated to the North in search of better opportunities. Those who stayed and fought against the Mafia often paid high costs for that decision. Some became local modern heroes, such as Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino, two prosecutors in the Palermo court who were killed by the Mafia in 1992. The fight against the Mafia is slowly changing, however, and one of the outstanding examples of a new trend in anti-mafia movements is Addiopizzo.

Addiopizzo is a nongovernmental organization (NGO), created four years ago by a group of young Sicilians. Through a joint effort between consumers and business, this organization works to demolish the important source of income that the *pizzo* represents for the Mafia. The NGO designed a label to certify that a



specific shop, restaurant or bank does not pay the *pizzo* to local mobsters. Currently, the list of *pizzo*-free businesses includes more than 300 shops, restaurants, bars, companies, banks, and enterprises.

Today the program is limited to the area of Palermo where around 80% of the businesses pay this “tax”, but the cities of Catania and Naples are also implementing similar programs.

Methodology

For this research, the author combined a wide spectrum of resources: the official website of Addiopizzo www.addiopizzo.com, numerous newspaper articles discussing Addiopizzo’s cause since its founding in 2004, an interview with a member of the organization, and literature on the Mafia in Sicily. Drawing from the large amount of journalistic information available, this paper presents the successful model that the organization employs in its work, despite the difficulties involved in battling the mafia and the entrenched *pizzo* system.

Secondly, the paper introduces some of the weaknesses that Addiopizzo has yet to resolve. With respect to specific literature about comparable cases, the author was unable to find additional approaches with similar strategies in the fight against organized crime.

The Origins of Addiopizzo

Addiopizzo started as a movement in 2004 in Palermo, Sicily. On the morning of June 29th all over the city of Palermo people found small stickers attached to their doors, windows and garages. On the stickers there was only one sentence: “*un intero popolo che paga il pizzo e’ un popolo senza dignità*” (“an entire population that pays the *pizzo* is a population without dignity”). For days the police investigated who had displayed the stickers and why.

This was Addiopizzo’s first step. The publicity, the confusion, and the noise created by the stickers forced an entire population to discuss one of the biggest taboos in Sicilian society—the *pizzo*. The seven members of the organization started meeting regularly in June 2004, and Addiopizzo was officially founded in 2005. By November 2008, active staff members exceeded fifty.

In 2007, another organization, Libero Futuro (Free Future), named in honor of Libero Grassi, an entrepreneur killed by the Mafia in the 1990s because he refused to pay the *pizzo*, was created as a spinoff from Addiopizzo. This organization intends to complement the *pizzo*-free label with legal and practical support for those entrepreneurs who decide to denounce the “racket”.

Anti-Mafia Movements: A Collective Action Problem

Giovanni Falcone once said in a famous interview, “The Mafia is a human phenomenon and as all human phenomena it has a beginning, an evolution and it will also have an end” (Falcone).

Therefore, in analyzing the Mafia and the fight against it, the same tools are used that are employed when evaluating other man-made negative externalities, such as global warming and pollution. In these cases, people coordinate in an attempt to find a remedy and to provide important public goods for future generations. Various types of coordination have involved market actors as well as institutions. Addiopizzo is applying a similar approach in its fight, coordinating an effort to

provide a public good through market actors and institutions.

Addiopizzo is founded on the idea that the fight against the Mafia requires collective action, rather than the work of individuals alone. Solitary action makes individuals vulnerable because they become a clear target for the Mafia. By attacking these single rebels, the Mafia creates a powerful symbolic effect, but the attacks rarely provoke a strong reaction of solidarity in the affected community. On the other hand, affiliating with a formal group provides a sort of defense mechanism. In fact, once the collective action problem is overcome and a large enough number of people decides to jointly undertake a risk and rebel against the Mafia, the criminal organization finds it harder to respond efficiently. Collective action works well in this situation because it is hard for the Mafia to predict how the populace will react to an attack on members of an organized group, as opposed to individuals with no group affiliation.

The Mafia's struggle to react to Addiopizzo's provocation is, in fact, a consequence of the tactic that has made the organized crime group so successful over the centuries: the strategy of silence. The Mafia has always operated within an atmosphere of silent acquiescence. The silence was broken only by isolated public punishments towards "rebels" or internal fights between rival Mafia families. The overarching goal, however, was always to subjugate the population through fear.

Addiopizzo's work breaks the barrier of the Mafia's terror by creating collective opposition. Mafia retaliation against a single individual from the NGO would fail to solve the Mafia's problem, since there would be another NGO member ready to continue the work of the victim. Retaliation would also have the potential to create unrest in the population. The nature and origin of Addiopizzo is based on the shared goal of fighting the Mafia collectively. Therefore, the possibility of losing one of the members to violent retribution is a well-known cost of the Addiopizzo campaign. Moreover, by attacking representatives of a popular grassroots movement the criminal organization might transform the victims into new popular heroes, further fertilizing the environment for a general uprising. Active discontent among Palermitans would damage the Mafia's interests more than the current decrease in profit from Addiopizzo's campaign.

A Strategy to Overcome the Collective Action Problem

Addiopizzo was able to overcome the collective action problem by employing a unique strategy that incorporates various interests in the fight against the Mafia. By exploiting all the resources that the market and public institutions provide, Addiopizzo synchronizes the efforts of consumers, business and institutional entities toward the same goal. This coordination of disparate parties with aligned interests in fighting the Mafia has revealed itself to be a winning tactic. Furthermore, the organization works exhaustively to develop a more favorable environment for the flourishing of its initiative by educating and informing civil society.

The First Step: Consumers

Addiopizzo realized that consumers were the first party it needed to reach. Sicilian consumers ultimately shoulder part of the costs of the *pizzo* in the form of higher prices imposed by the shopkeepers. Moreover, consumers are the easiest party to incubate in the anti-*pizzo* campaign because their participation involves neither significant risks nor elevated costs. In addition, consumers are not asked to incur the expense of creating a formally structured group; Addiopizzo already provides it. Given the fact that the public good consumers aim to obtain—the end of the Mafia—is highly valuable and the costs of achieving it are rather low, consumer involvement is key and it is the first logical step in overcoming the collective action problem.

The NGO believed that only after collecting evidence of consumers' demand for *pizzo*-free consumption would it succeed in persuading businesses to adhere to the program. Indeed, through the evidence of a clear, positive response from the citizenry, businesses were ensured that their activity would survive financially. Just as importantly, they also realized that they were not alone in the battle against the *pizzo*.

With the goal of creating this consumer support base, the organization drafted a Manifesto:

"Aware of the gravity, complexity and capillary spread of the phenomenon of 'racket' of the extortions in the Sicilian economic and productive reality, I claim that the entire society, economic and cultural network in which the economic actors work can and must play an active role in the fight against the pizzo.

Therefore, as a citizen and consumer aware of my power and responsibility, I commit myself to choose products and services provided by entrepreneurs, shopkeepers and professionals that do not pay the pizzo or that, having been victim of the request of pizzo, denounced it.

I also require that the institutions and the police renew the protection of those that had the courage to denounce it.

*Finally, I urge all the political forces to a stronger sensitivity toward the issue of the 'racket'.*²

The organization collected thousands of signatures, demonstrating the existence of strong popular support for change in Palermo. The Manifesto, available online, has been signed by close to 10,000 consumers.

The Business: The Label and the Process of Certification

Businesses face a different problem than consumers since the risk they face by participating in the Addiopizzo initiative is higher. In the past, the Mafia has reacted violently against those who refused to pay the *pizzo* by burning buildings and even killing rebellious entrepreneurs.

However, the incentives are also more significant to businesses than to consumers. By adhering to the Addiopizzo project, the shopkeepers achieve a private good, the termination of the payment to the Mafia, in addition to the public good of ending the Mafia's domain. The quandary in this case, therefore, is different from the consumers' collective action problem, and it is best described using a cost-benefit analysis. In other words, in the businesses' calculations, the incentives to participate to Addiopizzo must prevail over the feeling of fear and the risk of personal danger. This would realistically happen only after a sense of community and collective fight have convinced the business world that being part of Addiopizzo would decrease the risks of Mafia retaliation. In that sense, the strong support of consumers functions as a form of assurance.

By stimulating consumer demand and business interest, the Addiopizzo movement created a market for a tangible and recognizable sign of respect for the specific

standards of legality cited in the Manifesto. The organization developed a label that symbolized compliance to standards of legality and proposed it to the local businesses. This particular label is carried by the retailers and producers, not by the product itself. Similar to other labels such as Fair Trade, Addiopizzo ensures the consumer about the specific socially responsible business behavior. However, differently from many other labels, it does not produce an increase in the prices of the product and services, and it has an ambiguous impact on consumers' shopping patterns. In spite of the fact that many Sicilians do not support the Mafia, not all of them are ready to stand up to organized crime. The label may deter highly risk-averse consumers. The effect of the label on sales has not yet been studied. Therefore, Addiopizzo, as a label of social responsibility, may or may not have the potential economic incentive that other labels possess.

Importantly, the uncertainty of economic gains from the label also decreases the risk of free-riding. Showing the label and continuing to pay the *pizzo* would not provide significant benefits. The direct economic benefits of the label come from the decrease in costs due to the cessation of payments, rather than from increases in sales. Additionally, even in the event of a significant label-induced increase in sales by a business that continues to pay the *pizzo*, the new profit margin would probably cause the Mafia to significantly increase the *pizzo*.

As is the case with many other labels, Addiopizzo's label is granted to retailers and producers after a process of certification. The certification is conducted by a mixed third party entity, the Investigation Commission, which comprises of law professors, lawyers, the Dean of the Department of Law at the University of Palermo, members of *Comitato Addiopizzo*, the president of *Libero Futuro*, and various entrepreneurs. In the past, journalists, priests and the Chief of Police have also participated.

The businesses voluntarily submit their application to the commission in order to obtain the label. The body's first step is to interview the entrepreneurs to evaluate their motivations and personal experience. Secondly, the commission investigates the legal status of the economic activity. It also researches the history of the business, verifying the untainted behavior of the owner/manager through different sources such as newspaper articles and police reports.

² Translation by Chiara Superti, original version available in the appendix

In the final step, the entrepreneur signs a formal commitment not to pay the *pizzo* and to run the business in complete respect of the law. The goal of this document is to further link the image of the business to compliance with the legal standards dictated by the label. Failure to meet the requirements will not only result in exclusion from the list of *pizzo*-free businesses and loss of certification, but it will also damage consumers' trust in the entrepreneur, thereby harming profits. Since 2005, less than ten applications out of about 300 have failed to meet the commission's requirements.

The Institutional Side: The Monitoring Process

Addiopizzo declares on its website that failure to comply with the law will lead to an exclusion of a business from the list. However, the group has not yet implemented a clear process of continued monitoring. In fact, according to an interview with *Comitato Addio Pizzo* representatives, the organization relies on enforcement by the police as a "fire alarm" (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). If an investigation determines that one of the businesses carrying the label is actually paying the Mafia or collaborating with it, the business will be excluded from the list. The key question, therefore, is whether the police are a reliable and prompt third party provider of information regarding business compliance?

Despite the tainted reputations of members of public institutions, the Sicilian police force seems to have proven in the past few years that it is not corrupted by the power of the Mafia, at least at the highest levels. In fact, the force has won some important battles against the criminal organization by arresting important representatives. For example, in April 2006, Bernardo Provenzano, the head of "*Cosa Nostra*" since the beginning of the 1980s, was arrested. In February 2008, in cooperation with New York police forces, the Italian police captured around ninety of the Mafia's representatives. In particular, an important victory of the state with respect to the "racket" was the arrest of Salvatore and Sandro Lo Piccolo (father and son) in November 2007. Following this arrest, a list of all the businesses paying the *pizzo* to Salvatore Lo Piccolo, the "Senior Mafia Boss", was released. Furthermore, notes (*pizzini*) exchanged between Salvatore and his *picciotti*³,

³ Term that refers to the low level cooperators of the Mafia structured system.

marked twenty of the shopkeepers affiliated with Addiopizzo as "rebels" and detailed punishments for their transgression.

This last example speaks to the effectiveness of police work, which appears to function as a monitoring control and source of validity for the label. However, the work does not function as a continuous form of monitoring, which is a necessary aspect of Addiopizzo's operations. In fact, although the final goals of the NGO and the police coincide, the two groups pursue their objectives using different means, and therefore compliance verification over time is only a secondary effect of police work. For this reason, some businesses could restart paying the *pizzo* and continuing for months or years before being discovered. However, according to Addiopizzo's members, at this initial stage of the project it is unlikely that a shopkeeper restarts paying once he or she actually stops.

The Outreach Program

The last aspect of the Addiopizzo strategy consists of a variety of activities that the association organizes to inform and educate the citizens. These activities focus in particular on schools and the development of a clear concept of legality.

In schools, Addiopizzo's members organize small workshops for students to teach them about legality. These initiatives are essential to the future sustainability of the Addiopizzo project for three reasons. First, through education, the organization aims to form a new class of citizens and shape the attitudes of future generations. Secondly, by informing the children, Addiopizzo attempts to reach the parents in hope of influencing their consumption behavior. Finally, these educational workshops allow members to verify the response of the community to the initiative by observing the reaction of the families. Along the same lines, Addiopizzo organizes school trips to visit "anti-Mafia" sites. The schools in which Addiopizzo is active present projects that were developed in response to their visits at the *Pizzo-Free* party, where shopkeepers and various companies display their products. These parties have been held every May since 2006.

Cooperation with schools does not stop at the educational level. Schools, as an institution, are playing an active role in supporting the fight against the "racket". In October 2008, Addiopizzo obtained an

agreement with Guido Di Stefano, director of the Scholastic Regional Office, under which every company that provides any kind of product to Sicilian schools will have to certify that it does not pay the *pizzo*. The certification will be performed by the company itself, but it will have legal weight. Failure to comply with the declaration results in three years of total exclusion as a supplier of food or any other material to Sicilian schools. The agreement does not require participation in Addiopizzo's initiative, but it asks the entrepreneurs to sign a very similar statement of legality. An important detail of the agreement is that signatories commit themselves not to pay the *pizzo* from the moment they sign; there is no reference to the past. This gives businesses an opportunity to actually change.

An Example of Credibility Building

In the past four years, Addiopizzo has moved from being a small, relatively unknown association to a popular and respected organization. The organization has built a strong base of credibility and mobilized thousands of citizens who believe strongly in its mission. Addiopizzo's success derives from a combination of different factors. First, since the beginning of the organization, the founders have achieved incredible visibility in the local and national media thanks to a stratagem of placing posters and stickers anonymously around towns. This led to a certain level of popularity, which dramatically increased the community's attention to the case and, therefore, increased the number of potential "fire alarms" that could denounce a lack of compliance with the organization's legal standards.

Secondly, the group acquired the trust of many supporters as a result of its transparency. On the website, one can access the complete list of members of the NGO, members of the certifying commission, the organization's budget, and sources of funding. Furthermore, the organization has constructed a network of support and endorsements that include trustworthy and well-known consumer associations. Finally, the lack of clear economic incentives and the high risk of participation reduce the danger of free riders exploiting the organization's image.

Publicity and Visibility

Since its origins in the mysterious sticker episode, Addiopizzo has been constantly grabbing the attention not only of the local media, but also national and international media. The organization quickly gained

recognition in a number of articles reporting on the problem of "racket" in Sicily, thus becoming a point of reference in the fight against the illegal practice. Such popularity is fundamental to the survival of the organization and for the success of the label.

In fact, the visibility serves as a sort of protection against possible retaliation by the Mafia, since media coverage of an attack on Addiopizzo would be as great as the organization's current popularity and would bring the situation to the forefront of the entire population's mind. This is not in the interests of the Mafia, which wants to run its business in the background without interferences. As previously stated, publicity is not something that appeals to the criminal organization.

On the other hand, popularity also increases scrutiny of Addiopizzo, so it must be careful not to undertake actions that call into question the organization's integrity—a founding principle that the organization highly values. As this has not happened to date, the credibility of the organization has solidified, and with it trust in the Addiopizzo label.

Transparency and Various Sources of Funding

Another important sign of the organization's credibility is the transparency of the organization. Everything—the complete list of Addiopizzo's members, the list of participating shopkeepers and companies, the list of members of the Investigation Commission—is available on the Addiopizzo website. Furthermore, the previous year's budget with cash flow movements can also be found online.

The organization depends on various sources of funding. It relies on the spontaneous donations of consumers, who can also decide to divert part of their tax payment (5/1000)⁴ to Addiopizzo. Additionally, it receives funds from other Italian NGOs operating throughout Italy, and from writers (Giusy La Piana) and publishers (Coppola Editori) who devolve part of the proceeds from sales of their books. A combination of different sources of financial support is effective in protecting the independent nature of any association. In particular, given the specific kind of issues that Addiopizzo is fighting against, financial independence is a vital element in establishing credibility.

⁴ In Italy, it is possible to divert a proportion equal to 5/1000 of your tax payments to chosen non-for-profit organizations.

Endorsement by Consumer Organizations

Another important element of Addiopizzo's credibility is the endorsement of popular consumer organizations. In fact, on many of the posters and stickers appear the names of *Adiconsum*, *Lega Consumatori*, *Confconsumatori*, *Unione Nazionale Consumatori*, *Aduc Funzione Sociale* and *Sicilia Consumatori*. Among these, the National Consumers' Union is the oldest and most rooted in Italian society. It was founded in 1955 by Vincenzo Dona, with the goal of protecting the rights of consumers. The support given to the Addiopizzo initiative by these consumer associations adds an important source of credibility for the NGO.

The Idealistic Component

The target group for the organization comprises those consumers who are tired of the Mafia's control in Sicily and who are willing to participate in an effort to defeat it. They recognize Addiopizzo as the embodiment of their desire for a change. Hence, it is evident that there is a strong idealistic component to the nature of the NGO's support. Many of the consumers believe in the organization because its mission reflects their personal beliefs and interests (Lupia and McCubbins 1998). The credibility of Addiopizzo is not only built on factual observations, but is driven by the superior goal of the initiative.

As we saw in a previous section, the nature of the label creates disincentives for businesses to cheat. Given the lack of certainty of a financial return and the actual personal danger faced by the shopkeepers when rebelling against the Mafia, it is hard to argue for an elevated probability of free-riders. Furthermore, the idealistic component of the NGO amplifies the costs of cheating. In fact, in the case that a shopkeeper chooses to free-ride, he or she may face serious costs if the business is identified as non-compliant. Cheating in this context, with such a sensitive issue at stake, will have strong negative returns on the image of the activity. Indeed, cheating would directly signal that the specific shopkeeper is actually paying the *pizzo* while at the same time dishonestly exploiting the Addiopizzo name.

Beyond Sicily: Taking the Cause Outside the Border of Sicily

The model of Addiopizzo began to expand across Southern Italy with the launch of a branch in Catania in 2006 and with the flourishing of a similar initiative in

Naples. The organization has also started a series of projects and activities to increase the effectiveness of the label. One of the most interesting developments is the promotion of *pizzo*-free tourism, a form of tourism involving only Addiopizzo-certified activities such as restaurants and hotels. As a parallel to the concept of ethical and sustainable tourism that has been developing all over the world, the NGO wants to stimulate a similar phenomenon toward *pizzo*-free tourism. The innovative part of this project is that it would take the commitment to *pizzo*-free consumption outside the borders of Sicily and Italy: tourists coming from any part of the world will be involved in this trend.

Weaknesses of the Project

One of Addiopizzo's main strengths—the power of the cause that the label represents—also embodies the main weakness of the organization. The focus on the idealistic aspects of the label represents the main challenge for it to become an exportable model outside the social and political context of Sicily. Additionally, more attention needs to be given to the monitoring process. Relying on the national police force as a fire alarm might not always be effective, and certainly it does not ensure that cheaters are identified promptly and regularly.

An alternative would be a more structured relationship with the police force. For example, the organization could implement a system of random controls of the businesses' cash outflows to search for unexplained withdrawals. This could occur through the combined investigation of bank accounts and sales records. In the case of suspicious spending patterns, the investigation could be taken more in depth, in concert with police cooperation.

Another important critique that the organization has received since it started in 2005 is that the label creates an involuntary division between good and bad. In fact, over time, those that do not carry the label will be identified as paying the *pizzo* even if in reality this is not necessarily true. The members of the organization defend themselves by claiming that nowhere on the Addiopizzo website or in its manifesto there are references to any form of boycott or other kind of discrimination toward those businesses that do not decide to participate. However, Addiopizzo should face this criticism more directly in order to avoid any negative spin-off effects of the Addiopizzo initiative.

Conclusions and Future Directions of the Research

Addiopizzo has built a successful label that conquered the trust of consumers, thanks both to its four-fold strategy and to the process of credibility building. Moving from consumer demand to the institution of a label, the NGO constructed a model that effectively exploits both market dynamics and institutional channels. The strategy proposed by this Sicilian NGO is, indeed, a fascinating case study because of the way it created a network of cooperation between institutional actors (such as the police and schools) and market-led actors (consumers and businesses). Addiopizzo proved that the interests of institutions, businesses and consumers, which are often seen as mutually exclusive and not aligned, can be compatible.

Although the analysis of the actual impact of Addiopizzo's initiative on the Mafia's business is in its infant phase, the potential of this model to mobilize market actors and civil society in a common effort is clear. For this reason, Addiopizzo deserves to be studied in more detail in an attempt to transform it into a general model that could be implemented to fight other forms of organized crime or corruption.

In this paper we specify the limitations and the strengths of Addiopizzo's case. In order to shape a general model exploitable elsewhere, further research will focus on the potential to reproduce the model outside of the Sicilian context. Many other countries face similar challenges to those in Italy. The market-driven solution created by Addiopizzo may become an exportable remedy if properly adjusted to different national contexts.

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Websites of Interestwww.consumatori.itwww.addiopizzo.orgwww.camera.itwww.sosimpresa.it**Video Resources**<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a4mdrFj6CQM>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OpR3He-i_vY&feature=relatedhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6xGludL_FDg<http://video.google.com/videosearch?q=FALCONE+AND+BORSELLINO&emb=0&aq=f&aq=f#q=FALCONE%20AND%20BORSELLINO&emb=0&aq=f&aq=f&start=30><http://video.google.com/videosearch?q=FALCONE+AND+BORSELLINO&emb=0&aq=f&aq=f#q=FALCONE%20AND%20BORSELLINO&emb=0&aq=f&aq=f&start=30><http://video.google.com/videosearch?q=FALCONE+AND+BORSELLINO&emb=0&aq=f&aq=f#q=ADDIO%20PIZZO%20VIDEO&emb=0>**Appendices****Consumers' Manifesto**

“Cosciente della gravità, della complessità e della capillare diffusione del fenomeno del racket delle estorsioni nella realtà economica e produttiva siciliana, ritengo che tutto il tessuto sociale, economico e culturale nel quale agiscono gli operatori economici può e deve esercitare un ruolo attivo nella lotta contro il pizzo;

pertanto, in quanto cittadino e consumatore consapevole del mio potere e della mia responsabilità, mi impegno a scegliere prodotti e servizi forniti da imprenditori, esercenti e professionisti che non paghino il pizzo o che, essendo stati vittime di richieste estorsive, ne abbiano fatto denuncia.

Chiedo altresì che le istituzioni e gli organi di polizia rinnovino l'azione a tutela della sicurezza e dell'attività economica di chi ha avuto il coraggio di denunciare.

Sollecito, infine, tutte le forze politiche ad un concreto impegno ed a una maggiore sensibilità verso le problematiche attinenti al racket delle estorsioni.”(www.addiopizzo.org)

Shopkeepers involved in money extortion		
REGIONS	SHOPKEEPERS INVOLVED	% OF TOTAL
Sicilia	50,000	70%
Calabria	15,000	50%
Campania	40,000	40%
Puglia	17,000	30%
Basilicata	1,000	10%
Lazio	6,000	10%
Abruzzo	2,000	10%
Lombardia	5,000	5%
Piemonte	2,000	5%
Emilia Romagna	2,000	5%
Other	20,000	6%

Source: SOS Confesercenti/ Translation by Chiara Superti